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DOES DOMBERGERS THEORY OF THE
CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION EXPLAIN
SATISFACTION WITH IT OUTSOURCING?
Peter B. Seddon













The paper tests whether what appears to be a strong general theory of why organizations choose to acquire
goods and services through contracting rather than in-house service provision, namely Dombergers theory
of the Contracting Organization, applies in an IT context.  The validity of that theory is tested using data from
a survey of 235 senior IT managers.  The paper concludes that, in a field still searching for appropriate theory,
Dombergers work does indeed provide a very useful lens for understanding IT outsourcing.  His four types
of benefit of contractingspecialization, market discipline, flexibility, and cost savingemerge as a concise
summary of senior IT managers explanations of why their organizations chose to outsource IT.  The paper also
tests Dombergers theory against IT outsourcing outcomes, and further develops a model of organizational
satisfaction with IT outsourcing based on Dombergers four factors. Three hold up, but cost savings were not
important in explaining organizational satisfaction with IT outsourcing for either smaller or larger
organizations. This outcome is explained in terms of the performance influencing factors inherent in
Dombergers own model, in the distinctive difficulties inherent in managing IT, and in the location, time period,
and context of the research data used by our study. 
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, information technology (IT) outsourcing has emerged as an important tool for enabling organizations around
the world to gain access to specific skills and services, focus on their core competencies, and in some cases, reduce the cost of
IT service provision. During this period of IT outsourcing growth, much has been learned about what works and what does not,
and numerous conceptual models for understanding when firms should and should not outsource have been proposed (see, for
example, Ang and Straub 1998; Grover et al. 1998; Hui and Beath 2001; Kern and Willcocks 2002a; Lacity and Hirschheim 1995;
Loh and Venkatraman  1992). While there is no shortage of studies about when, what, and how a firm should outsource IT, the
search for an appropriate explanatory theory continues. One recent work, The Contracting Organization by economist Simon
Domberger (1998), stands out as an attempt to provide a fundamental understanding of the economic incentives for contracting
out services. Domberger conducted a series of empirical studies, surveys, and meta-analyses of contracting out of different
services (Domberger and colleagues 1986, 1987, 1994, 2000).  His findings have been that after controlling for other factors that
affected costs, organizations that contracted out service provision were able to save about 20 percent of the cost without a drop
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of service quality.  Hodges (2000) meta-analysis of 28 empirical studies, including three from Domberger and his colleagues,
confirms this finding.
Many IT researchers will argue that Dombergers analysis is too simple, e.g., that IT outsourcing is much more complex than
outsourcing of refuse collection.  Kern and Willcocks (2002b) and Poppo and Lacity (2002), for instance, have argued that IT is
not just another resource like advertising, or even human resources. If such authors are correct, Dombergers theory will probably
break down when applied to IT outsourcing.  Alternatively, if Domberger is correct, his theory will explain benefits, even for IT
outsourcing.  Hence the research question addressed in this paper: Does Dombergers general theory of the contracting
organization explain IT outsourcing outcomes?  The remainder of the paper is structured in four main sections. Section 2
summarizes Dombergers theoretical argument.  The third section provides details of survey data available for this study.  The
fourth section uses principal components analysis to test the validity of Dombergers benefits categories.  The fifth section tests
the explanatory power of Dombergers four factors in explaining variance in organizational outcomes and satisfaction with IT
outsourcing.
2 DOMBERGERS THEORY OF THE CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION
According to Domberger (1998), the benefits of contracting out, as he calls it, come from the four sources defined in Table 1.
These sources of benefits apply to outsourcing generally, not just IT outsourcing.  The first two benefits are benefit drivers that
can apply to either purchaser or provider organizations, rather than benefits per se. To clarify the impact of IT outsourcing on a
purchasing organization, the authors have constructed Table 2.
The first benefit driver in Table 1 is specialization.  Domberger (Chapter 5, pp. 75-92) argues that if a firm contracts out something
it is not so good at, it can devote its energies to doing more of what it is good at, and both parties will benefit.  There are three
points to note about the benefits of specialization:
 When contracting out leads to specialization in the service provider, the purchasing firm gains access to higher quality
services such as higher quality advice.  
 The level of competition in the service-provider market determines the extent to which the purchasing firm might see
additional benefits (beyond access to high quality services) in terms of lower costs.  This is discussed further in the market
discipline row.
 Where contracting leads to specialization in the purchasing firm, the benefits will be found not in lower costs, but in increased
revenue.  Revenues will increase because the purchaser will benefit from its own economies of scale, offer a better quality
or lower cost product or service, and so attract more customers.  
Table 1.  Dombergers (1998) Summary of Contracting Benefits 
Title Benefit
Specialization Specialization leads demonstrable economic benefits. By concentrating on activities in which an
organization is relatively more efficient, total value added is maximized. It also facilitates the exploitation
of scale economies. (p. 51)
Market
discipline
Market discipline provides a range of benefits, namely, focus by the purchaser on outputs not inputs,
competition (contestability) between suppliers, choices by purchasers, and innovative work practices. (p.
51)
Flexibility Networks of small organizations linked to their clients via contract can adjust more quickly and at lower
cost to changing demand conditions compared to integrated organizations. (p. 51)
Cost savings International studies show that significant cost savings are achieved by contracting, on average of the
order of 20%. As a rule, efficiency gains need not lead to lower quality. (p. 51)
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Table 2.  Applying Dombergers Benefits to IT Outsourcing Contexts
Benefit Driver How the Purchasing Organization Will Benefit 
Specialization  The purchaser sees benefits from concentration on its own core business in terms of increased
profitability, through cost efficiencies and revenue gains.
 The purchaser will have access to expert knowledge and skills, a particular benefit for smaller
organizations.  Such access can lead to improved IT services and cost savings to the vendor that
may be passed on to the purchaser to a greater or lesser degree. 
 The purchaser will see cost savings if the vendor gains from specialization AND competition
motivates the vendor to share those benefits.
Market
discipline
 Competitive pressure is crucial to achieving cost savings, and at least similar quality.  As a rule,
efficiency gains need not lead to lower quality (Domberger 1998).
 Clearer definition of services required can result in less wasted effort. 
Flexibility  The purchaser will find it easier to add and change vendors than to build and maintain services in-
house. Such flexibility can result in considerable future cost savings. 
 Contracting out can provide scale and scope numerical, functional, and financial flexibilities.
Cost savings  Contracting out can achieve cost savings averaging 20%. These should be measured relative to the
cost of providing comparable services in-house.
 Cost savings come from the above factors expressed through actualization of economies of scale,
superior management practices through specialization over time, and the fact that, against
Williamson (1975), internal transaction costs are, in practice, rarely less than those incurred from
transacting with the market. 
Secondly, Domberger (Chapter 3, pp. 38-48) regards market discipline as a source of benefit from contracting for two reasons.
First, competition creates incentives for service providers to deliver services at lower cost (e.g., through innovations) and higher
standards than they would feel motivated to deliver in a noncompetitive environment. Domberger argues that it is the threat of
competition that drives the benefits, not whether the service provider is in-house or an external vendor.  Secondly, market
discipline requires the client organization to consider carefully the nature of the service required prior to contracting, and to
develop output measures to judge service quality.  Such measures, Domberger says, are often not clearly articulated prior to
contracting out. 
The third benefit source, flexibility, can be achieved by offering many smaller contracts to different providers for shortish time
periods, e.g., 3 to 7 years (Domberger 1998, p. 131).  Flexibility benefits also include headcount and financial and functional
variability (i.e., access to resources on a pay-as-you-use basis). 
The fourth benefit is cost savings.  In particular, Domberger posits that cost savings flow from market discipline, which release,
in the purchasers favor, the specialization and production economies of scale, superior management practices, and comparable
transaction costs the vendor can achieve, and can then, profitably, pass on to the purchaser. 
Summarizing, Table 2 applies Dombergers theory to IT outsourcing from the purchasing organizations perspective. Some
benefits may appear as cost savings; others will be less tangible. From his empirical studies, Domberger states that these four
benefits areas represent both the reasons why organizations contract out, and also the benefits they can rationally expect, provided
specialization, value capture, control, flexibility, organizational change, and sound contracts are efficiently operationalized and
managed (Domberger 1998).
3 A MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL SATISFACTION WITH
IT OUTSOURCING
In this paper, we test Dombergers theory against organizational rationales for IT outsourcing, and the actual benefits they receive.
We make the distinctive contribution of developing and applying the model presented in Figure 1 to test the explanatory power
of Dombergers benefit categories. The model assumes that Dombergers four factors (presented in Table 1) are valid for IT out-
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Cost savings Not tested: Partnership
Figure 1.  Explaining Organizational Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing
sourcing1 and, in our own contribution to theory development, hypothesizes that each independently causes variance in satisfaction
of the organization with IT outsourcing.
Most of the model is self-explanatory.  Dombergers four factors are shown on the left. A key factor known to determine success
with IT outsourcing, namely relationship management or partnership (Kern and Willcocks 2002a) is not tested because it is not
in Dombergers list of sources of benefits.  Satisfaction is used as the dependent variable in our model because it involves a
weighing up of costs and benefits, often judged relative to expectations.  With respect to the weighing up of costs and benefits,
Naylor et al. (1980) define satisfaction as the result of the individual taking outcomes that have been received and evaluating
them on a pleasant-unpleasant continuum. Here, satisfaction seems very similar in meaning to Seddons (1997) perceived net
benefit.  With respect to achievement of expectations, Lacity and Willcocks (2001, p. 151) judged outsourcing a success when
the outcome of IT sourcing decisions met expectations.  In short, we chose Satisfaction as our dependent variable because it
taps notions of both net benefit and expectations met or unmet.
4 METHOD
4.1 The Survey
To test the applicability of Dombergers theory to IT outsourcing, we use data from a recent survey of senior IT managers
concerning their perceptions of the benefits or otherwise of IT outsourcing (Cullen et al. 2001).  In late 1999, near the height of
the dot-com boom, our survey of IT sourcing practices was mailed to senior IT managers in 1000 large Australian organizations.
The list of organizations included what we judged to be the 500 largest organizations, by employment, and a 50 percent random
sample from the next 1,000 largest organizations.  It included both private and government sector organizations.  Particular care
(including many phone calls) was taken in developing a list of names of CIOs and senior IT managers in each organization.
Among many other questions, the survey enquired about what was being outsourced, the reasons for and against outsourcing, and
the outcomes from outsourcing. After one follow-up letter in January 2000, we received 235 responses.  The response rate of
23.5 percent is higher than usual for surveys of this nature.  Our respondents represent organizations employing 18 percent of all
employees in private-sector organizations with 200 or more employees, and 12 percent of all employees in government
organizations in Australia.  This is a significant chunk of the workforce in large Australian organizations.
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4.2 Contextual Information from Respondents
In order to have confidence in the analysis that follows, it is important to understand the respondents and their firms.  Smaller
organizations of less than 1,000 employees numbered 101, while  larger organizations with 1,000 or more employees numbered
127.  Of the surveyed organizations, 97 percent indicated that they spend a portion of their IT budgets on outsourcing (the average
being 28 percent).  The annual IT outsourcing budget for the 231 respondents to this question was approximately A$1.7 billion.
Extrapolating this figure based on the ratio of employees in the respondent firms to employees in similar organizations Australia-
wide, we estimate total Australian IT outsourcing expenditure was of the order of A$5 billion to A$8 billion in 2000.  Expenditure
on IT outsourcing was not industry-specific; it spanned all 19 industry sectors surveyed. Larger organizations outsourced slightly
more of their IT, but the difference was not great.
Respondents were given a list of 23 IT services and asked to indicate for each service whether it (1) had not been formally
considered for outsourcing; (2) had been considered and rejected; (3) was under current consideration for outsourcing; (4) had
already been partially outsourced; or (5) had already been fully outsourced. The most frequently outsourced services relate to
infrastructure, and to stable, mature operations.  Over half of the respondents outsourced hardware support and maintenance,
systems implementation, applications development, applications support, applications maintenance, WAN (wide area network)
services, cabling and infrastructure in premises, and education and training.  Generally, both smaller and larger organizations
shared similar outsourcing patterns. However, ad hoc or project-based activities such as systems implementation, applications
development, and communications were fully or partially outsourced 10 percent to 15 percent more frequently by smaller
organizations.
5. RESULTS
5.1 Analysis Step 1:  Do Dombergers Benefits Categories
Apply to IT Outsourcing?
In our study, respondents were given a list of 21 possible reasons for outsourcing and asked to tick all that applied as primary
or secondary reasons.   Their responses are summarized in Table 3.  The most popular reasonsthose that were cited by more
50 percent of organizations as either primary or secondaryare highlighted in bold (Table 3).
Inspection of the highlighted items in Table 3 suggests that they correspond to all four of Dombergers advantages of contracting,
namely, specialization (items 1, 3, and 6), market discipline (items 7 and 14), flexibility (items 8 and 11), and cost savings (items
9 and 15).  Since all questions in the survey were prepared without influence from Dombergers (1998) workmost questions
came from Lacity and Willcocks (2000) and from Cullen (1994, 1997), based on their extensive first-hand experience of issues
that were important to managers involved in IT outsourcingthis means that the above intuitive grouping of items is already
supportive of the validity of Dombergers benefits categories. Principal components analysis was used to see how respondents
to the survey grouped items in their own minds.  Responses were scored 0 if respondents indicated the item was not a reason for
outsourcing, 1 if the item was a secondary or supporting reason, and 2 if it was a primary or driving reason for outsourcing.  Due
to missing responses to some questions, only 168 responses were used in the analysis. The rotated factor matrix is shown in
Table 4.  The first three factors are readily interpretable as three of Dombergers four reasons for contracting (specialization, cost
savings, and flexibility).  The best label for the fourth factor in Table 4 might be better service, rather than market discipline,
although items 18 and 7 could be interpreted as indicators of market discipline.  
In short, Dombergers four types of benefits from contractingspecialization, flexibility, cost saving, and something closely
related to market disciplineappear to be a very good way of summarizing senior IT managers explanations of why their
organizations chose to outsource IT.   The implication is that general theories of contracting do seem to explain IT outsourcing
decisions, and that organizations considering outsourcing, and researchers who study outsourcing, should look for these types
of benefits in evaluations of IT outsourcing deals.  In addition, the discussion in the earlier  section (see Table 1) suggests that
benefits such as access to better advice, growth opportunities for the purchaser, and flexibility also need to be factored into the
overall cost-benefit equation in such analyses.
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Table 3.  Reasons for Outsourcing IT Services










1 Access to better or more skills/expertise 9% 31% 60% 91%
2 Unable to provide services internally 28% 23% 49% 72%
3 Concentration on core business 23% 33% 43% 76%
4 Better match of resource supply to demand 28% 33% 38% 71%
5 Access to better or more technology 22% 41% 37% 78%
6 Better use of in-house personnel 27% 38% 35% 73%
7 Obtain better service 30% 35% 34% 69%
8 Improve flexibility for the business 35% 34% 31% 65%
9 Reduce cost 42% 30% 28% 58%
10 Compliance with outsourcing mandate 56% 16% 28% 44%
11 Allow more flexible work practices 49% 29% 22% 51%
12 Enhance management control 49% 34% 17% 51%
13 Rationalize assets 62% 22% 16% 38%
14 Change users' accountability 49% 37% 14% 51%
15 Reduce staff numbers 55% 32% 14% 46%
16 Shift from capital to operating expense 62% 25% 13% 38%
17 Industry or economic development 73% 17% 11% 28%
18 Dissatisfaction with internal providers 74% 20% 7% 27%
19 Temporary solution 84% 10% 5% 15%
20 Get penalties for non performance 85% 11% 3% 14%
21 Improve cash flow 89% 9% 2% 11%
Note:  Number of respondents ranges from 186 to 200.
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Table 4.  Reasons for Outsourcing
Principal Components Analysis, listwise deletion of missing values; 21 questions, n = 168; eigen values > 1
Coding:  Not a reason = 0, Secondary reason = 1, Primary reason = 2
Factors: 1 = Specialization; 2 = Cost savings;  3 = Flexibility; 4 =  Market discipline (better service?)
Factor
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Access to better or more skills/expertise .794      
6 Better use of in-house personnel .780      
4 Better match of resource supply to demand .698      
5 Access to better/more technology .667      
3 Concentration on core business .504     -.426
13 Rationalize assets  .757    
9 Reduce cost  .705     
16 Shift from capital to operating expense  .645     
15 Reduce staff numbers  .637     
21 Improve cash flow  .619     
12 Enhance management control  .440     
11 Allow more flexible work practices   .701    
14 Change users' accountability   .677   
8 Improve flexibility for the business .507  .558    
18 Dissatisfaction with internal providers    .739   
7 Obtain better service   .561   
17 Industry or economic development     .751  
10 Compliance with OS mandate     .692  
20 Get penalties for non performance    .433 .623  
19 Temporary solution      .774
2 Unable to provide services internally      .622
Extraction Method:  Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method:  Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
5.2 Analysis Step 2:  Do Dombergers Factors Explain Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing?
5.2.1 The Dependent Variable:  Organizational Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing
The dependent variable in the model in Figure 1 is satisfaction of the organization with IT outsourcing.  Respondents were given
two prompts: 
 Overall, our organization is satisfied with the benefits from outsourcing
 Our organization is satisfied with the performance of our service provider
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Figure 2.  Overall Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing
(192 Respondents)
and asked to rate their own overall success with IT
outsourcing (which may involve a number of contracts) on
a scale of 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.2
Results for the first question above are shown in Figure 2.
They show that 71 percent of the 192 respondents rated
their overall satisfaction as neutral or above. The most
frequent score was 5, from 63 respondents.  Respondents
dissatisfied with their outsourcing arrangements totaled 29
percent.
Responses to the second prompt were similar.  Our
satisfaction measure for the regression analysis below is an
average of responses to these two prompts (Cronbach alpha
reliability statistic 0.897). The distribution of satisfaction
scores was independent of industry, organizational size, or
percentage of IT outsourced.  Service quality apparently did
not suffer.  In fact, the data from the survey (questions 7
and 18 in Table 5) actually showed a positive correlation
(r = 0.46, p < 0.01) between cost savings and service
quality improvement. 
5.2.2 Independent Variables:  Dombergers Four Constructs
Respondents were given a list of 21 possible outcomes from outsourcing and asked to classify outcomes into substantial result,
moderate result, none, and worse for all outcomes that applied to their organization. Table 5 shows the percentages of
organizations that ticked each box.  Note that although the prompts are the same as for Table 3, the earlier questions asked about
reasons for outsourcing.  The responses in Table 5 below are about outcomes from outsourcing. The most satisfactory outcomes
those where high numbers of organizations reported moderate or substantial resultsare highlighted in bold. Also highlighted
in bold is the least satisfactory outcomereduced costswhere significant numbers of respondents reported the situation was
worse as a result of IT outsourcing.  
Principal components analysis was used to test whether responses to these outcomes questions grouped consistently with the 15
similar questions about reasons for outsourcing earlier in the survey (see Table 3).  Responses were scored -1 if respondents
indicated the outcome was worse than before outsourcing, 0 if there was no change, 1 for a moderate result, and 2 for a substantial
result.  Because of listwise deletion of missing values, only 85 observations were used in the analysis.  Since the sample size is
small and the ratio of observations to items is only 6:1 the analysis cannot be relied upon for defining factors (Tabachnick and
Fidell 1989, p. 603).  Nonetheless, two factors were readily interpretable as Dombergers specialization and cost savings factors.
The third and fourth factors, market discipline and flexibility, were not clearly interpretable.
The frequency of missing values in the data set created a problem for analysis. Second generation analysis techniques such as
LISREL and PLS require that scores for all indicators for all latent constructs must be available. With the present data set, that
reduced the number of usable observations to 85. However, mean scores can be computed even if one item is missing.  With the
present data set, use of mean scores allowed us to use data from 165 respondents, not just the 85 who completed all 15 questions
of interest.  The compromise is between use of data from more respondents and fidelity of measurement.  For this study, we
decided to use data from the 165 respondents, which forced us to calculate mean scores and use ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression as our analysis tool.  After examining Cronbach alpha reliability coefficients, we decided to use the following questions
from Table 5 for computing scores for the four independent variables:  specialization, the mean of questions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
(Cronbach alpha = 0.81); market discipline, question 7 only (obtain better service); flexibility, question 8 only (improved flexibility
for the business); and cost savings, the mean of questions 10, 11, 15, 18, and 21 (Cronbach alpha = 0.72).
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1 Access to services could not provide internally 2% 8% 47% 43% 191
2 Access to better or more skills/expertise 2% 12% 45% 41% 188
3 Better use of in-house personnel 2% 13% 59% 26% 170
4 Better match resource supply to demand 3% 17% 56% 23% 172
5 Concentration on core business 1% 20% 57% 22% 166
6 Access to better/more technology 1% 29% 49% 21% 175
7 Obtained better service 8% 18% 58% 17% 173
8 Improved flexibility for business 6% 26% 53% 14% 172
9 Enhanced management control 5% 28% 52% 15% 165
10 Reduced staff numbers 3% 40% 40% 17% 162
11 Shift from capital to operating expense 1% 35% 46% 18% 130
12 Changed users' accountabilities 1% 43% 48% 8% 167
13 Allowed more flexible work practices 4% 38% 46% 12% 161
14 Compliance with OS mandate 1% 40% 35% 25% 126
15 Rationalized assets 2% 43% 44% 12% 147
16 Have penalties for non performance  59% 36% 4% 135
17 Industry or economic development  65% 28% 6% 124
18 Reduced cost 22% 36% 35% 7% 173
19 Dissatisfaction with internal providers 2% 67% 26% 4% 123
20 Temporary solution 1% 66% 28% 5% 104
21 Improved cash flow 4% 69% 21% 6% 121
5.2.3 Testing the Model of Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing
Testing the model in Figure 1 using OLS regression and the data from all 165 respondents, path coefficients for specialization
benefits and market discipline benefits were both significant (0.22, p = 0.021, and 0.37, p = 0.000, respectively, Adjusted R2 =
0.28).   (Path coefficients for flexibility and cost savings were not significant.)   However, further testing showed that these factors
were not equally significant for organizations of different sizes.  Since the results from the more detailed analyses are more
informative, and space is limited, only the more detailed results are reported here. 
Results from the regression analysis for the larger organizations (organizations with 1,000 employees or more) are shown in
Figure 3.  Those for smaller organizations are shown in Figure 4.  The results are quite surprising. The most significant factor that
influences satisfaction for larger organizations is market discipline (specifically, obtaining better service).  At conventional
confidence limits, there were no significant factors to explain satisfaction for smaller firms.  Cost savings was barely significant
for the larger firms (p = 0.075) and not significant for the smaller firms. Is there some sort of mistake here? Why is cost savings
not the primary determinant of satisfaction?  Reviewing the data we find that the cost savings result is not a mistake.  In results
reported in Table 3, cost savings was reported as a primary reason for outsourcing by only 28 percent of organizations.  The
respondents main reason for outsourcing (a primary reason for 60% of respondents) was to access better or more skills.  
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Significance:  +p < 0.10 , nsnot significant
Figure 3.  Overall Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing for Larger Organizations
(Organizations with 1,000 or More Employees)
Figure 4.  Overall Satisfaction with IT Outsourcing for Smaller Organizations
(Organizations with Less Than 1,000 Employees)
Another possible explanation of the lack of significance of cost savings in explaining variance in satisfaction is that the statistical
analyses show quite high correlations between our measures of specialization (S), market discipline (M), and flexibility (F).  Could
collinearity problems be the reason for the relative unimportance of cost savings?  Averaging the three aforementioned variables
to create a new variable, SMF, and rerunning the regressions eliminates any collinearity problems.  Coefficients from the now
two-independent-variable model for larger organizations were SMF (0.43, p = 0.000) and Cost savings (0.13, p = 0.17), with an
Adjusted R2 = 0.23.  Corresponding coefficients for smaller organizations were SMF (0.48, p = 0.000) and cost savings (-0.08,
p = 0.49), with an Adjusted R2 = 0.19.  Cost savings is not significant in either regression! 
Our conclusion is that, at least for this data set, factors other than cost savings were the most important determinants of satisfaction
with IT outsourcing.  There is no question in our minds that cost reduction is an important general reason for contracting out
(Hodge 2000). This has also been confirmed in study after study of IT outsourcing (Ang and Straub 1998, p. 543; DeLooff 1995;
Lacity and Willcocks 1998, 2001, pp. 27-28; McLellan et al.1995; Sobol and Apte 1995).
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But there are other benefits from outsourcing.  Benefits such as opportunity costs avoided through access to specialized knowledge
and concentration on the core business (specialization benefits) and improved service from external providers (a market-discipline
benefit) are evidently also important drivers of satisfaction.  One explanation of the relatively low significance of cost savings
in Figures 2 and 3 is that cost savings may be like a hygiene factor (Herzberg et al. 1959).  In other words, if costs rise,
management may be dissatisfied.  However if costs are perceived to be under control, other factors, such as improved service
quality, drive satisfaction. A second possible confounding factor is that the survey was conducted between November 1999 and
February 2000, at the very height of the dot-com boom. At that time, cost savings may not have been an important factor in IT
managers minds.  Perhaps if the survey were repeated today, in a more recessionary climate,  cost savings would be a significant
factor in explaining satisfaction with IT outsourcing. 
There are other, possibly related, explanations. First, at the time of the study Australia was experiencing considerable IT skills
shortages.  Australia also, relatively, has a higher percentage of smaller organizations than Western economies such as the United
States and the United Kingdom.  In such a situation, while large cost savings might not be coming through as a result of IT
outsourcing, satisfaction might be skewed toward actually getting the IT work done and actually having the skills available rather
than towardcost savings delivered, or even quality of service achieved. Second, as Domberger stresses throughout his work, cost
savings are a product of how well specialization, value capture, control, flexibility, organizational change and sound contracts
are efficiently operationalized and managed. It may well be the case, as others have argued, that IT outsourcing is more difficult
to operationalize and manage effectively than other types of activity such as catering and advertising, not least because the
economics are not easy to gauge and are still not well understood. Moreover, they change quickly.  New technologies can change
economic equations dramatically. Additionally, according to Kern et al. (2002), in about 20 percent of IT outsourcing contracts,
suppliers cannot make a reasonable profit and so search for additional services and revenues not covered by the contract, resulting
in hidden costs to the purchaser. 
6 CONCLUSIONS
The major limitation of this study is that the data on which the analyses are based were not purpose-collected for the study.  This
caused three problems.  First, the 21 questions used to collect the data were not designed from the outset to measure Dombergers
factors.  As a result, the market discipline construct was not measured as well as one would like.  Second, the questionnaire was
very long (eight pages), and for the questions used for this paper, respondents were asked to tick all that apply.  This meant that
many respondents did not answer all questions (even when there was a checkbox headed not applicable).  As a result, there were
a large numbers of missing values.  This, in turn, forced us to use mean scores for computing some variables and OLS regression
analysis instead of second-generation analysis techniques.  Third, we did not use seven-point Likert scales for all questions.  
The main contribution of this exploratory study is that it shows that Dombergers theory of the contracting organization does seem
valid in an IT context.  Evidence of the validity of Dombergers factors is presented in the form of the principal components and
the OLS regression analyses presented.  By providing explanations of variance in organizational satisfaction with IT outsourcing,
the regression analyses also yield two additional contributions: 
 They suggest that satisfaction with IT outsourcing is driven by different factors for larger organizations (defined in this
study as those with more than 1,000 employees) than for smaller ones.
 Although cost is clearly an important consideration in any form of contracting out, cost savings were not significantly
associated with satisfaction with outsourcing for either larger or smaller firms. We posit that there are particular factors
associated with IT outsourcing economics, but also the timing and context of, and type of, organizations in the survey
help to explain this outcome.
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